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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67(1988) and 35-1-77(1)(a)
(1988) are the determinative statutes in this case. Rule R490-1-9
and R490-1-17 of the Industrial Commission's Administrative Rules
are also applicable.1

They are set forth in full in the Addendum

hereto as EXHIBIT A.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
All parties agree that this Court's review of the Industrial
Commission

decision

is

governed

by

the

Utah

Administrative

Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-16(4)(1988).
Respondents, however, have misconstrued the substantive basis of
Petitioner's challenges to the Industrial Commission decision.
Petitioner has challenged the Commission's use of the "significant
cause"

standard

for

awarding

permanent,

total

disability

compensation as well as the Commission's failure to refer the
medical causation issue to a Medical Panel. Those issues are pure
questions of law and under the Administrative Procedures Act, the
standard of appellate review which applies to such questions of law
is "correction of error" and there is no deference to the agency's
interpretation of the law.

Utah Administrative Procedures Act,

Unfortunately, the Briefs and previous Orders in this matter
use R490-1-9 and R568-1-9 interchangeably as well as R490-1-17 and
R568-1-17. The Commission simply changed the prefix of all "R490"
rules to "R568" in 1992 but no substantive changes were made with
respect to these two rules. Since the law in effect on October 31,
1990, governs this matter, citations to R490-1-9 and R490-1-17 will
be used herein.
1

Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4)

(d) (1988).

Mor-Flo

Industries v. Board of Review. 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 1991).

Morton

International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

Respondent's reliance on

Tasters LTD v. Dept. of Employment Security, 222 UAR 63 (Utah App.
1993), Wagstaff v. Dept. of Employment Security, 826 P.2d

1069

(Utah App. 1992) is misplaced since there is no grant of discretion
to the agency on the issues presently before the Court.
Respondents also completely ignore the controlling principal
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act —

that it is to be liberally

construed and that any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved
in favor of the injured worker.

State Tax Commission v. Industrial

Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984).

McPhie v. Industrial

Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IN REPLY
Respondents

do

not

dispute

that

Petitioner

suffered

an

industrial injury on October 31, 1990, that he has established the
occurrence

of

an

industrial

accident

and

the

required

legal

causation.

They also do not dispute the Petitioner is presently

permanently and totally disabled.

Their only grounds of dispute is

the

industrial accident was not a

specious

argument that his

"significant cause" of his admitted permanent, total disability
status.
Petitioner admits there are bits of evidence in his medical
records

to

support

the

Administrative
2

Law

Judge's

findings.

However, that evidence is neither significant nor substantial. In
order t

support the ALJ's findings, his medical records must be
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Whatever ambiguities existed in the record were clarified by
Dr. Albrand's medical reports and the letter from Nancy Hughes at

BRIEF

OF

PETITIONER).

Said

evidence

showed

that

the

Administrative Law Judge relied upon incomplete medical records and

This case also presented "significant medical issues" which
mandated the utilization of a Medical Panel under

Industrial

<

a

allowed an evaluation by expert, medically trained doctors who
would have the Peti tioner/s entire
1 -

medical record. The findings of

::: i in : :ii tj

i

this ground because they did not request and utilize ail of
Petitioner's medical records when they made their finding of total

This

Court

Commission1^

should

determination

summarily

reverse

that Petitioner

did

the
not

Industrial
establish

medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award
establishing that fact.

In the alternative, this matter should be

remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue.

ARGUMENT
I
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT PERMANENTLY. TOTALLY DISABLED DUE TO
HIS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.
Respondent's allege that the Industrial Commission's Rules on
permanent, total disability require that the Administrative Law
Judge determine "if a significant cause of the disability is the
Claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or
causes.

. ."

Administrative Code R490-1-17(c).

The error in

Respondent's argument is that there is no provision in the Utah
workers' compensation statutes that the industrial accident must be
a "significant cause of the disability."

Utah Code Annotated,

Section 35-1-67, the statute governing permanent, total disability
claims, does not contain any reference to a "significant cause"
standard.

Indeed, the statute merely requires that the Commission

make a finding of disability "as measured by the substance of the
sequential

decision

making

process

of

the

Social

Security

Administration. . . "
This

Court

has

recently

determined

that

the

Industrial

Commission has erred in evaluating an injured worker's injury under
the standard set forth in that Rule because the injured worker's
4

injury occurred after promulgation of the Rule.

As the Court

stated in Abel v. Industrial Commission, 221 UAR 15, 16 (Utah App.
1993) :
By focusing on the significant cause of Abel's
disability, as provided by Rule R490-l-17(c) rather than
evaluating Abel's claim under Section 35-1-67, the Board
applied an incorrect standard and such ruling could not
stand.
This Court in Abel also expressed in a footnote that they were
not expressing "any view as to whether Rule R490-l-17(c) falls
within the Commission's rule-making authority or exceeds the same
by imposing a 'significant cause' requirement."
Footnote 2.
does

Id. at 17,

It is Petitioner's position that Rule R490-l-17(c)

exceed the Commission rule making authority by imposing the

"significant cause" requirement and that such a requirement is
unlawful and void.
Although there is a certain grant of discretion to the Utah
Industrial Commission, Section 35-1-67 requires that it make it's
findings in conformance with the Social Security Administration
sequential decision making process. There is no provision in the
Social Security sequential decision making process which imposes
the "significant cause" standard. By imposing such a standard, the
Industrial Commission exceeded the grant of discretion granted to
it by the Legislature.

No agency, the Industrial Commission

included, enjoys the discretion to exceed the authority vested in
it by the Legislature.

Tasters v. Dept. of Employment Security.

Id. at 65. Hence, the Industrial Commission, having exceeded its
authority, has its ruling reviewed
5

for legal error, without

deference to the agency's findings.

Utah Code Annotated Section

63-46b-16(4)(d)(1989). LaSal Oil Company v. Dept. of Environmental
Quality. 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah App. 1992).
A review of Respondent's arguments show that they continue to
select isolated and selected provisions from Petitioner's medical
records to support their conclusions.
records

and

the

attendant

The review of each of those

conclusions

contained

therein

is

illuminating.
A.

The Social Security Determination - The Administrative

Law Judge and the Industrial Commission placed great weight on the
Social Security Administration's determination that Petitioner's
permanent, total disability
condition.

status was a result

of his

heart

However, Petitioner has proven that the SSA looked only

at the cardiac problems and did not even review the records of Dr.
Church in regards to the neck/back/upper extremities.

It is clear

from SSA Operations Supervisor Nancy Hughes' letter that, "the
records

of

Dr.

Church,

the

doctor

for

his

neck/back/upper

extremities were not considered so it may well be that he could
have qualified for SSI benefits upon those problems as well.11 (R.
at 12 6r and EXHIBIT D in BRIEF OF PETITIONER).
The ALJ's and Industrial Commission's reliance upon the Social
Security determination was in error and resulted in blatant, faulty
fact finding.
B.

Dr. Church - Respondent's correctly acknowledge that Dr.

Church, the Neurologist who treated Mr. Kleinsmith for his cervical
problems, assessed a 20% permanent, partial impairment rating.
6

They vacuously assert that, "This is not a permanent, total
disability."

In fact, this is an incredulous statement.

cite absolutely no support for this assertion.
Commission

has

a

long history

of

awarding

They

The Industrial
permanent, total

disability status to individuals with whole person impairments
significantly less than 20%. Even the above cited case of Abel v.
Industrial Commission, 221 UAR 15 (Utah App. 1993) involved an
industrially related impairment of only 5% and subsequent award of
permanent, total disability!

Clearly an individual with a 2 0%

disability may well be permanently and totally disabled, with or
without combining other non-industrial impairments such as a heart
condition.

A 20% impairment to the spine is serious and may well

be the straw that breaks the camel,s back.
Indeed, as Petitioner has repeatedly pointed out, he was
capable of working prior to his industrial accident and was not
capable thereafter.

Regardless of what other medical problems he

may have had, it was the industrial accident which took him out of
the work place. There is absolutely no support in any provision of
his medical records for any contrary conclusion.
C.

Dr. Redd - Dr. Redd is the Cardiologist who treated

Mr. Kleinsmith

for his heart problems.

Again, the critical

determination is, "What took Mr. Kleinsmith out of the work force?"
It was not his heart condition.

Indeed, no doctor, Dr. Redd

included, has ever made any mention that Mr. Kleinsmith should
refrain from work due to his coronary condition following his
second heart attack.

He was already incapacitated and instructed
7

to be off work for the previous half year at the time of his heart
attack on May 11, 1991.

His coronary condition did not take him

out of the work force. nor is it keeping him out.

He was working

with his coronary condition from 1984 (the date of his first, more
serious, heart attack) to the date of his industrial accident,
October 31, 1990.

Under these circumstances, it is hard to follow

the reasoning of the Commission and Respondent contending that he
is permanently, totally disabled from his heart!
D.

Dr. Boyd Hoibrook - Dr. Holbrook's review of the medical

records is less than complete and full, although he concludes that
the industrial accident did not specifically cause any identifiable
pathological process, and that it did not appear that any of the
permanent impairment should be ascribed to the industrial accident
of October of 1990, as the ultimate surgery was inevitable.

Dr.

Holbrook did not even meet with Mr. Kleinsmith and we have no way
of knowing whether he based his opinion on a complete set of
medical

records.

Even

viewing

the

facts

in

favor

of

the

Respondents, and ascribing a zero percent impairment due to the
industrial accident, that is a striking difference to the 20%
impairment specified by Dr. Church and compels the referral to a
Medical Panel as argued below.
E.

Dr. Albrand

Medical causation in this case was also

provided by Petitioner's neurosurgeon Dr. Otmar W. Albrand.

Dr.

Albrand concretely and unambiguously established both legal and
medical causation in his December 10, 1992 report where he remarks
as follows:

"It is my opinion that Mr. Kleinsmith is suffering
8

from injuries sustained 10-31-90 in an industrial accident and due
to these injuries he's unable to return to substantial work or
gainful

employment."

(R. at 127).

CAUSATION BE BETTER ESTABLISHED?!

HOW CAN MEDICAL AND

LEGAL

Petitioner cannot fathom a more

succinct or bullet-proof statement by a doctor to establish both
medical and legal causation.

It is beyond belief that the ALJ, the

Commission and the Respondent all totally ignore this smoking gun
which shoots gaping holes through their position.
Respondent highlights a minuscule amount of medical evidence
in favor of the Industrial Commission's ruling which is grossly
incomplete and legally insufficient.

Petitioner, on the other

hand, has marshalled all of the evidence, which mandates reversal
of this case.

The Petitioner's medical records, read as a whole,

compel the conclusion that it was his industrial accident which
removed

him

from

the

work

force

and

not

any

of

his

other

impairments, despite how significant they may be. This is the only
logical conclusion.

II
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO ASSIST IN THE
RESOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUES,
The Respondents have completely mis-analyzed this argument.
Petitioner's

argument

is

that

Utah

Code

Annotated

35-1-

77(1)(a)(1988) and Utah Industrial Commission Rule R490-1-9 compel
the

submission

of this dispute to a Medical
9

Panel.

Despite

Respondent's

arguments

to the

contrary,

such

referral

is

not

discretionary in this case.
Although
Annotated,

reference

Section

to

35-1-77

a

Medical

(1988)

Panel

appears

under

Utah

Code

discretionary,

that

discretion is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the
Commission's own Rules and Regulations (Utah Admin. Code R490-1-9).
Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993).
The failure to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such
referral is mandatory is plain error. "In some cases, such as where
the evidence of causal connection between the work-related event
and the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer
the

case to a medical panel may be an abuse of discretion."

Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308
(Utah 1985).

See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah

1986).
Rule R490-1-9 requires that a panel "will" be used when "one
or more significant medical issues may be involved."

The rule

does not give the Administrative Law Judge unbridled discretion to
determine the existence of such issues, but rather definitively
states that "Significant medical issues are involved where there
are:

(a)

Conflicting

medical

reports

of

permanent

physical

impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole person...."
It

cannot

be

disputed

that

this

case

clearly

contains

conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which
vary by more than 5% of the whole person.

The Administrative Law

Judge and the Industrial Commission take the position that there is
10

no industrially related impairment from the cervical injuries. Dr.
Church has indicated that there is a 20% rating.

The difference

between 0% and 20% is more than 5% so medical panel referral is
mandatory.
The second instance where panel referral is mandatory appears
in R490-l-9(b): "Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary
total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days..."

Clearly there

are conflicting medical opinions on the

of time Mr.

Kleinsmith should be off.

length

Dr. Albrand has stated that he is off

indefinitely ("permanently, totally disabled") and Dr. Holbrook in
his

IME has

stated

that, "The

industrial

accident

did

specifically cause any identifiable pathological process."
69).

not

(R. at

The Commission has not awarded any compensation benefits

whatsoever.
industrial

Thus, the difference between zero days off due to the
accident and being off

indefinitely

is clearly a

variance of more than 90 days.
The third criteria for mandatory medical panel referral is the
most evident one that Mr. Kleinsmith satisfies, R490-l-9(c):
"Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000.00."
Since the Respondent has not paid anything on this claim, all of
Mr. Kleinsmith's medical bills remain outstanding (or had to be
paid by a secondary institution).

His $13,000.00 neck surgery,

incurred due to his industrial accident, remains outstanding and is
clearly more than $2,000.00.
Thus, Mr. Kleinsmith satisfies not one, but all

three

criteria

for mandatory medical panel referral. This accentuates the gravity
11

of the medical and compensation issues of this case which the ALJ
and the Commission have casually ignored by summarily dismissing
his claim without expert, mandatory medical input.
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related
injury and the Applicant's permanent, total disability, although
clear to Petitioner, was at least uncertain to the Commission and
failure to refer the matter to a Medical Panel was overt error.
The ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW should be reversed and the
matter remanded with directions to refer the matter to a Medical
Panel since failure to do was in direct conflict with Industrial
Commission practice and rule.

The failure to obtain a Medical

Panel opinion resulted in the Administrative Law Judge lacking
essential
claim.

and necessary

information to adjudicate

Petitioner's

The ALJ supplanted a required medical panel decision with

a medical assessment of her own, while also totally ignoring a
concrete medical
Albrand.

causation

letter by treating physician

Otmar

(R. at 127).

CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
This case presents substantial evidence that

Petitioner's

permanent, total disability status is legally and medically the
result of his industrial injury.

Dr. Albrand's report on that

point is clear and unquestionable.

The Industrial Commission, in

denying benefits to the Petitioner, has ignored and failed to apply
the entire beneficent purpose of the workers' compensation system.
The failure to refer Petitioner to a Medical Panel
12

is a

glaring error and calls in and of itself for reversal and remand.
In a case such as this, the referral to a Medical Panel was not
only appropriate but required under the Industrial Commission's own
Rules and Regulations.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested

that this Court

reverse the final agency action, and remand with instructions to
either award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and
medical evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a
Medical Panel.
The Court of Appeals should also hold that the Industrial
Commission has exceeded its authority by promulgating a rule which
has a standard higher than that of a statute. . That is, the
language in Rule R490-l-17(c) [again, now known as R568-1-17(c)]
requiring injured workers to prove that their industrial injury is
a "significant cause" of their disability should be invalidated as
there

is no

such requirement

or authority

for this

in the

permanent, total disability statute, U.C.A. Section 35-1-67.
DATED this 8th day of January, 1994.

BRIAN D. KELM, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
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EXHIBIT A:

1,2

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988)

3

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988)

3

Utah Administrative Code R490-1-9.

4

Utah Administrative Code R490-1-17.

15

35-1-67, Permanent
total
disability
—
Amount
of
payments
Rehabi Mtation.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial
accident, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this
section.
Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a
finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission
shall
adopt
rules that conform to the substance of the
sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R.
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial
312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week,
plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate
under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage,
rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section
35-1-69.
The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers1
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable

EXHIBIT A

page 1

permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section
35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social
Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in
all cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings
have occurred:
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, refer the employee to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under
the State Board for Vocational Education for rehabilitation training. The
commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $3,000
for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee.
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for
Vocational Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee
has fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the
employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding
rehabilitation.
The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits.
The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as
determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to
regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or
the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully
cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands,
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such
body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated
according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability
is required in any such instance, (as last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah
1988 Second Special Session)
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R490-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following
guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a
significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant medical issues are involved when there are:
*
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary
more than 5% of the whole person,
+
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date
which vary more than 90 days, and/or
it
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there
is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the
medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing,
re-submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to be
examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to
obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment
rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical
consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for
further medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative Law
Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund.
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R490-1-17* Permanent Total Disability.
T. The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a
finding of total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, as revised. The use of the term "substance of
the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some latitude on the
Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its findings relative
to permanent total disability. The Commission does not interpret the code
section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the Commission in
permanent and total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final
until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation has been accomplished.
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee
has made, or is in the process of making, a determination of disability under the
foregoing process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of instituting
the process on its own behalf.
(c?)
In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has
qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine
if a significant cause of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident
or some other unrelated cause or causes.
D.
To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the
Commission shall rely upon and be guided by the rules of disability determination
published by the Social Security Administration Office of Disability publication
SSA Pub. No. 64-014, as amended.
In short, the sequential decision making
process referred to requires a series of questions and evaluations to be made in
sequence. These are:
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the listed impairments in
Appendix 1 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014?
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her previous
work? *
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total disability, the applicant
shall be referred to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation and
rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation determines
that the applicant is unable to do any other work because of his age, education,
and previous work experience, and as a result of an industrial accident, there
shall be a hearing to review the determination of the Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation and any objections thereto, unless the parties waive the right to
a hearing.
F.
After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the
Commission shall issue an order finding or denying permanent total disability
based upon the preponderance of the evidence and with due consideration of the
vocational factors in combination with the residual functional capacity as
detailed in Appendix 2 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014.
KEY:
1990

workers1 compensation, time, administrative procedure, filing deadlines
35-1-1 et seq.
35-2-1 et seq.
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